1982-90: when times were bad in Houston by Robert W. Gilmer & Iram Siddik
HoustonBusiness
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS  • HOUSTON BRANCH  • JUNE 2003
A Perspective on the Houston Economy
n the last issue of Houston
Business, we introduced a new
coincident index of economic
activity for Houston based on
employment, the unemployment
rate, real wages and real retail
sales. The index optimally
weights and combines the data
to best portray the Houston
economy. It is most useful as a
tool to gauge current economic
conditions. The index shows
Houston slogging through a mild
but prolonged decline. Economic
activity peaked in April 2001,
followed first by a decline of
less than 1 percent and then by
a long period of no growth that
extends to the present. 
The same data, however,
can be used to document the
past. Figure 1 shows the coin-
cident economic index from
1981 to 1990, a period of very
bad times in Houston. The
Houston economy peaked in
March 1982 and did not revisit
that level until February 1990.
The initial decline of 13.2 per-
cent ended in August 1983. It
was followed by an expansion
of 5.9 percent that ended in
November 1984 and another
decline of 10.2 percent before
Houston finally touched bottom
in January 1987. Houston re-
turned to the March 1982 level
of economic activity in Febru-
ary 1990 after a rapid 21.1 per-
cent climb from the bottom.
The entire cycle of bust and
recovery took seven years and
11 months. 
This article looks back at
the 1980s and the speculative
fever that bred the bust—in
oil, real estate, banking, and
savings and loans. Houston
was at the center of the oil
boom and the ensuing bust
and led the state into and out
of recession. The experience of
the ’80s reminds us that while
the Houston economy could be
healthier today, it has certainly
seen much worse in the not-
too-distant past. 
Boom and Bust in Oil
The earliest roots of many
of the problems of the 1980s—
inflation, the 1981–82 recession,
the bust in both oil and real
estate—can be traced to the
mile-long gas lines of 1973. 
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of the ’80s reminds 
us that while the
Houston economy
could be healthier
today, it has certainly
seen much worse
in the not-too-
distant past.The Israeli–Arab October War
began Oct. 6, 1973, and a week
later the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) announced an immediate
5 percent production cut, to be
followed by continued monthly
cuts until Israel withdrew to its
1967 borders. The cartel also
announced an embargo on oil
shipments to the United States
and the Netherlands. 
Although the gasoline lines
were real, the production cuts
were never fully implemented,
and oil easily slipped through
non-embargoed countries such
as Great Britain and France.
The gas lines were largely the
product of panic buying by
U.S. consumers and businesses,
and—along with domestic
price controls on energy—gave
rise to the myth of resource
scarcity that prevailed for the
rest of the decade. 
The primary oil weapon be-
came an excise tax—a price in-
crease per barrel levied by a
cartel experimenting with a new
and aggressive pricing policy
throughout the 1970s. Each time
a new disruption occurred in
world oil markets, from pipeline
breaks to the Iranian revolution,
OPEC used the event to ratchet
up the price and then maintain
it. OPEC’s pricing became more
aggressive after it implemented
a formal quota sys-
tem among mem-




mittee saw the ulti-
mate target as just
under the price of
synthetic oil—the
only possible sub-
stitute, as they saw




Figure 2 shows the
upward push in oil prices 
during the late 1970s and the 
collapse in the 1980s. One 
substitute turned out to be con-
servation and alternative fuels,
a response that had been
delayed by price controls on
oil and natural gas in the
United States. Another was
cheating on quotas by OPEC
members unable to control
their domestic budgets or com-
ply with their quotas due to
spending pressures at home. 
Most important, high oil prices
stirred substantial exploration
in relatively high-cost areas
outside the Middle East, such as
the North Sea, Alaska and Mex-
ico. Non-OPEC production rose
from 3.8 million to 7 million
barrels per day between 1981
and 1992. After 
a failed attempt to
ratchet the price
upward after the
start of the Iran–Iraq
War in 1980, the
OPEC price began to
retreat. In 1986, the
cartel briefly disinte-
grated in a squabble





The myth of re-
source scarcity and
the inevitable upward spiral of
oil prices kicked off an un-
precedented boom in oil explo-
ration in the United States. As
Figure 3 shows, the domestic
rig count rose from 1,242 in
January 1973 to a peak of 4,530
in December 1981. On the
downside, the rig count fell to
663 in July 1986, an 85 percent
decline. 
The fact that the boom was
based in oil inevitably put Texas,
and especially Houston, at the
epicenter of events. World War
II had seen Persian Gulf pric-
ing replace “Texas-plus” as the
world oil standard, but Texas
and surrounding states remained
important producers on global
standards. Houston was home
to the state’s oil service and
machinery industry. Between
1970 and 1980, the Texas popu-
lation grew 27 percent, adding
nearly 1.8 million new people.
One demographer estimated
that based on the trends of the
1970s, Houston would be as
large as Mexico City—in ex-
cess of 20 million population—
by 2000. U-Haul trailers leaving
Michigan for Texas exceeded
those making the return trip by
a ratio of 100 to 1. 
The companies most closely
tied to domestic drilling also
had close linkages to Houston’s
oil and manufacturing sector.
They were drillers and oil serv-
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SOURCE: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.ice companies, such as Schlum-
berger, Dresser, Halliburton,
Cameron Iron Works and
SEDCO. Sales of drill pipe,
tools, rigs and services grew to
$40 billion in 1982 but fell to
just $9 billion by 1986. The
number of industry workers fell
from 100,000 in 1982 to fewer
than 25,000 in 1986. 
The collapse of oil prices
and drilling activity in 1986
brought the period of greatest
distress for these companies,
and virtually all became candi-
dates for merger. Combinations
could increase scale economies
in operations, cut corporate
overhead and reduce the num-
ber of field locations. The 1986
merger of Baker International
and Hughes Tool, long and bit-
ter rivals in the drill bit market,
came to symbolize the despera-
tion of the times. Between
March 1982 and March 1987,
more then 225,000 jobs—
approximately one in eight—
disappeared in Houston. 
Real Estate and S&Ls
The rapid growth of Hous-
ton and Texas fed a boom in
real estate development. You
didn’t have to know the oil in-
dustry to capitalize on the oil
boom. You could simply buy
and sell real estate in Houston
or Dallas. Single-family homes,
apartments, retail centers,
offices and industrial space
were brought to the market at
a frenzied pace. The initial
shock of declining oil prices in
1981–82 slowed development,
especially in oil cities like
Houston and Midland–Odessa.
But just as the oil boom began
to fade, real estate got an
important new lease on life
from an unexpected source—
the savings and loan industry. 
S&Ls had long been conser-
vative, local lenders, filling a
niche in the market for small
mortgages. Their fatal flaw,
however, was borrowing short
to lend for long periods at
fixed rates. In the 1970s, as
inflation heated up after the
Vietnam War and two oil-price
spikes, short-term interest rates
rose sharply, and S&Ls found
themselves paying much more
for funds as deposit ceilings
were lifted (Figure 4). Caught
holding long-term mortgages
paying only 3 to 4 percent 
with short-term rates briefly
spiking to near 20 percent,
three-fourths of the industry
was insolvent by the late 1970s.
Regulators began to organize
combinations of insolvent S&Ls
into new “phoenix” institutions
whose primary asset was regu-
latory goodwill, an accounting
trick to turn the negative capi-
tal position into an asset. The
institutions were sold to invest-
ors for tax advantages and
spreads guaranteed by regula-
tors and up to 40 years to write
down the goodwill. 
In 1982, the Garn–St. Ger-
main bill converted the stodgy
S&Ls into high-flying invest-
ment vehicles, allowing them
to not only invest their deposits
in commercial real estate but
also invest in their own de-
velopment projects. Texas,
California and Arizona liberal-
ized the investment rules even
more, and S&Ls were sucked
into the Southwestern real
estate boom with a vengeance.
S&Ls began to bid up the
yields they paid on their de-
posits to attract hot, federally
insured funds in blocks of
$99,999—just under the insur-
ance limit—and invest the
money in real estate. Rust Belt
thrifts were not left out; they
freely invested in loan partici-
pations originated by S&Ls from
Arizona to Texas to Florida. 
The Texas real estate boom
ended badly, of course. The oil
market fundamentals that fed
the initial expansion continued
to deteriorate through 1987, as
did the job market statewide.
Then the Tax Reform Act of
1986 eliminated tax shelters for
passive real estate develop-
ment, even wiping them out
retroactively. Suddenly, deals
done years earlier were worth
much less, and the impact on
the value of existing real estate
was devastating.
In 1989, the S&L crisis ended
with the Financial Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act,
which imposed rigid capital
standards for S&Ls and a more
rapid write-off of regulatory
goodwill. Of the 279 S&Ls in
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SOURCE: Baker Hughes Inc.Bank of Chicago had purchased
more than $1 billion in loan
participations from Penn Square.
In July 1984, the FDIC injected
$15 billion in capital in return
for a controlling interest in the
Chicago bank in what would
become the first modern “open
bank” transaction. 
Other energy lenders failed
on the heels of Penn Square:
Abilene National Bank in
August 1982 and three Midland–
Odessa banks in 1983. Lenders
to drillers and the oil service
industry were hit hard early as
the rig count began its collapse
and repossessed drilling equip-
ment drew little more than 10
cents on the dollar at auction.
By the end of 1987, all four
independent banks in Midland
and three of the four in Odessa
had closed. 
The second shoe dropped
in 1986 with a double dose of
bad news: First, the capitula-
tion of the rig count and oil
prices redoubled the pressure
on energy lenders. Second,
after banks fled from energy
lending to real estate, overin-
vestment in all segments of real
estate emerged in every major
market in the state. Even a
strategy of geographic diversi-
fication into Austin, El Paso,
Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston
and San Antonio did not pro-
tect Texas banks from the
existence at year-end 1987, 225
failed or were forced into in-
voluntary mergers, two merged
voluntarily and two were liqui-
dated voluntarily by their direc-
tors (Table 1).
By 1986, not just Houston
but Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin
and San Antonio had a four- to
six-year supply of office build-
ings, apartments and retail
space. Houston had 200,000
vacant homes, twice the normal
level for a city its size (Figure 5).
Postings and foreclosures in
Harris County peaked in mid-
1987 at 50,000 postings and
30,000 foreclosures per year.
Properties repossessed by the
Federal Housing Administration,
the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., the Veterans Administra-
tion, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, Fannie Mae and
other agencies all had to be dis-
posed of, leading to a vicious
cycle of property prices that
were depressed further by dis-
posal, more worthless loans,
weakened financial institutions
and even more repossessions.
Texas Banks 
Banks are more diversified
lenders than S&Ls, which origin-
ally specialized in mortgage
lending and later broadened to
commercial real estate. Unfor-
tunately, in the 1980s when
everything went wrong, diversi-
fication simply offered banks
more ways to get into trouble. 
Early problems emerged in
the international arena. Several
of Texas’ largest banks, mostly
in Dallas, had actively begun
lending to developing countries
in Latin America and Southeast
Asia and Iron Curtain countries.
Global recession and the decline
in oil revenues after 1981 left
many of these countries unable
to service their bank debt. In
September 1982, both Mexico
and Brazil announced they
could no longer meet bank obli-
gations. Texas bankers found




1981 decline in oil
prices also quickly
had consequences




homa City, one of
the most aggres-






Texas Thrift and Bank Failures, 1983–92
Texas as Texas as
S&L percentage Bank percentage
failures of U.S. failures of U.S.
1983 1 2.8 3 6.3
1984 2 9.1 6 7.6
1985 1 3.2 12 10.0
1986 2 4.3 26 18.8
1987 4 8.5 50 27.2
1988 90 43.9 113 56.5
1989 8 17.0 133 64.6
1990 72 22.9 103 61.3
1991 55 23.7 31 25.0
1992 7 10.1 29 24.2
SOURCE: Joseph M. Grant, The Great Texas Banking Crash: An Insider’s
Account (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), pp. 27, 40.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986
may have put the final nail in
the coffin of many of these
banks, retroactively wrecking
the economics of what initially
were sound credits and putting
downward pressure on prop-
erty prices statewide. The
dilemma for many banks be-
came whether to sell real estate
that was rapidly declining in
value or to hold onto it. Selling
meant realizing losses that
would further damage already
weak capital positions. Holding
on meant waiting for a turn-
around in real estate markets, 
a turnaround that would not
come in time for many institu-
tions.  
Table 1 summarizes the
number and timing of Texas
bank failures. Table 2 traces
the fate of the state’s largest
bank holding companies in the
early 1980s. Of the 10 largest at
the beginning of the decade,
only one survived—Cullen/
Frost Bankers. The others
merged with out-of-state inter-
ests or failed. 
Conclusion
Recessions are often de-











in both oil and real
estate, in the 1970s.
The reaction, in
terms of the extra-
ordinary depth and
length of the fol-
lowing downturn,



















have a glut of office space. 
But the scale of overinvestment
pales in comparison with the
1980s, and the state’s mild
recession is more a pause in
growth than a massive write-off
of past errors. Like the rest of
the nation, growth will resume
in Houston and Texas with the
revival of business confidence
and renewed investment. 
— Robert W. Gilmer
Iram Siddik 
Gilmer is senior economist and
vice president at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Houston




Largest Texas Bank Holding Companies in the Early 1980s:
Status by 1990
Allied Bancshares Inc.—Acquired by First Interstate 
Bancorp, Los Angeles, in January 1988 without federal
assistance.
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc.—Operating profitably without
federal assistance.
First City Bancorporation of Texas—Received $1 billion
infusion from Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) in
September 1987; reorganized under management of outside
group that raised $500 million in new capital. 
InterFirst Corp.—Federally assisted takeover by NCNB
Corp. in July 1988; assisted by the FDIC with a $1 billion
cash infusion in March 1988; merged with RepublicBank in
March 1987 to become First RepublicBank Corp.
Mercantile Texas Corp.—Federally assisted takeover of
most banks by Bank One Corp., Columbus, Ohio, in June
1989; taken over by the FDIC in March 1989; merged with
Southwest Bancshares Inc. in October 1984 to become
MCorp. 
RepublicBank Corp.—Merged with InterFirst in March
1987 to become First RepublicBank Corp. 
Southwest Bancshares Inc.—Merged with Mercantile
Texas in October 1984 to form MCorp. 
Texas Commerce Bancshares—Acquired by Chemical
Banking Corp., New York, in May 1987 without federal
assistance. 
SOURCE: Houston Business, February 1992.
Figure 5
Harris County Postings and Foreclosures, 1980 to Present


































SOURCE: Foreclosure Listing Service.T mained very profitable. Demand
is flat for gasoline, down for jet
fuel and very strong for resid-
ual fuel oils that can substitute
for natural gas. Inventories are
at the bottom of the normal
range for both gasoline and
distillates, and despite high lev-
els of production by refineries,
there has been limited progress
in refilling gasoline inventories




was very strong in April but
definitely cooled off in May for
a number of products—propy-
lene, styrene, PVC and MTBE.
The weakening has not been
dramatic—more of a speed
bump than a fall off a cliff.
Reasons vary from a softer
housing market and excess
inventory from buying ahead 
of the Iraq war to weaker
demand from Asia. 
Natural gas prices at $5–$6
per thousand cubic feet have
been the primary drivers in
price increases for PVC, nylon
and polypropylene. Prices and
revenues for many products are
near record levels, but only be-
cause of high feedstock prices.
The industry’s profit margins
remain near levels usually asso-
ciated with a recession trough. 
market remains sluggish, with
both occupancy and rents fall-
ing. A weak job market, contin-
ued apartment construction and
the affordability of home own-
ership have cooled apartment
rentals. 
Houston’s office market
continues to struggle after the
2002 slump but finally seems to
be stabilizing. Industrial occu-
pancy is stable, but only thanks
to a drop in construction and
substantial incentives offered
by warehouse owners. 
Oil Services and Machinery
Optimism is clearly grow-
ing in this sector, with the out-
look having swung in favor of
a pickup in drilling activity that
could last a couple of years.
High natural gas prices, driven
by inventories 50 percent
below normal, have changed
the outlook for drilling. The
domestic rig count has pushed
over 1,000 in recent weeks,
and respondents seemed opti-
mistic that 1,200 or more rigs
could be working by the third
quarter. That level of activity
would soak up excess capacity
in oil services; spill over into
Houston’s manufacturing sector
for pipes, valves and machin-
ery; and begin to add to local
job totals. 
Refining
Margins for refiners contin-
ued to decline from the high
levels of this winter but re-
HoustonBeigeBook May 2003
here is some good news
for the Houston economy. Con-
fidence is growing that high
natural gas prices will fuel
more exploration in coming
months, boosting Houston em-
ployment in mining and manu-
facturing by the third quarter of
this year. 
U.S. economic data, in con-
trast, remain disappointing, al-
though it will be at least a cou-
ple of months before we
understand how well the U.S.
economy is performing follow-
ing the Iraq war. Preliminary
data from Houston’s Purchasing
Managers Index for April indi-
cate a fourth consecutive month
of local expansion, although
the job market has yet to reflect
any significant improvement. 
Retail and Auto Sales
Retailers remain disappointed
with current sales, which are
running behind last year’s lev-
els by high single digits. The
only way to improve store traf-
fic is through sales and promo-
tions. Sales of big-ticket items
are particularly difficult. The
slow sales are widely shared 
by all classes of retailers. 
Auto sales in April were
down 11 percent from last year
and are off 4 percent year to
date. Incentives and price re-
ductions remain an important
ingredient of auto and truck
sales as well. 
Real Estate
Existing home sales have
leveled off in Houston, with
sales gaining slightly in March
compared with last year and
then slipping back by 4 percent
in April. The local apartment
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